Kabylia, a particularly mountainous area, is located east of Algiers and has today a population of about 5 000 000 inhabitants, among whom more than 99 % are Kabyle native speakers. This region, though well-known for its die-hard resistance to the French colonial army, got nothing but complete ungratefulness as recognition, after the so-called independence, as well from the Arab and / or the Berber populations that agreed with the Islamo-panarabist theses advocated by the “Ulema” [1] - and the Algerian Arabist intellectuals, as from the illegitimate regime which proclaimed itself the guarantor of the national constants [2] , which excluded even the least reference to the Amazighity / Kabylity.

Of course, this racist and negationist treatment did not leave the Kabylians indifferent. Besides the uninterrupted pressure from the Kabylian organisations, great popular uprisings had oftentimes shaken the central authority in Kabylia (in 1963, in 1980, in 2001). Meantime, the Algerian authorities developed a multitude of strategies of defence and attack which aimed at reforming the Kabylian society, which yearns for freedom, so as to lead it, as a first step, towards disintegration and destruction, and, as a second step, towards its reconstruction on foundations which will assure its complete subordination.

Among the strategies worked out by the Algerian regime to confront the Kabylian phenomenon, two ones really proved to be dangerous for the Kabylian entity: arabization and hard Islamization, i.e., the political utilization of Islam.

1. Arabisation:

The first attempts to impose the Arabic language in Kabylia date back to the colonial period. In 1948, one year after the beginning of the Berberist crisis, the Algerian Ulema, under the leadership of the panarabist Mohamed Al-Bachir Al-Ibrahimi, wrote in their newspaper Al-Bassaïr that “the Arabic language is a free spouse and without a co-wife”, rejecting therefore obviously the Berber language that the Berberists (all of them from Kabylia) threw into the limelight as a constituent element of the Algerian identity. Then, from 1949 up, Messali Lhadj and his followers, relying on the support of the Arab States of the Middle-East, had shouted out their “Algeria is an Arab country. It must turn to the countries of the Near East and become an element of the Arab nation”, excluding therefore unambiguously the Amazigh element.

At the independence, and after it had put an end by blood and steel to the rebellion [3] of the year 1963, which raised once again the identity issue, the Algerian regime, invaded by a gang of Baathists parked in Algero-Tunisian borders, thought of a devilish program [4] of depersonalisation of the Kabylians. So, during the period which went from 1963 to 1988, it was strictly forbidden to speak Kabyle language in the army, the administration and courts, obliging therefore the Kabylians to learn Arabic and to use it in those places even when they had to talk to members of their families (see ’Incriminating Evidence ’, by Arezki Aït Larbi, in Kabylia.info). It is also during this period that the Algerian State sent in the Kabylian schools flocks of Arab teachers brought from Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Palestine to force our schoolchildren to express themselves in class only in Arabic. And to reinforce the presence of the Arabic language in Kabylia, Boumediene’s regime started its program of “one thousand socialist villages”. Villages which were built smack in the middle of Kabylia and which served as settlements to the nomadic Arabs brought as agriculturists to work in agrarian cooperatives set especially in plains, such as those situated at the outskirts of Imcheddalen, Tazmalt, and Akbou, in the departments of Bouira and Bejaia [5] . As for the administration, acting in favour of the Arabic language, it took great pleasure in falsifying the Kabylian toponyms, which (fortunately not all) underwent both structural and semantic changes. Thus, “Ilmaten” became “El-Maten”, “Imcheddalen”, became “Mchedellah”, “Tala-G’udi”, became “Ain Zebda”, “Iazzugen” became “Azazga”; in brief, the visitor would imagine himself in any other Arabic-speaking region of Algeria. And when, from 1980, under the influence of Berber movements, the Kabylians began claiming the official use of Amazigh forenames, the Algerian authorities replied with the distribution, in the services of the registry office, of a dictionary of Arab forenames!

After “the opening” of the political landscape in 1989, the Berber language, its defenders and the whole Kabylia, began being subjected to a general attack from ordinary people and from political and cultural personalities too much influenced with the Islamo-Baathist ideas predominating in the Middle-East. Hence, to reroute the Kabylians accused, besides Berberism, of belonging to “hizb frança” [6] , owing to their use of the French language to the detriment of Arabic, the deputies voted for a law for the general implementation of the Arabic language, on November 17th, 1990. Irritated by this law, the Kabylians became hardened and cried out for the immediate constitutionalisation of Tamazight. Manipulative, and going in the opposite direction of all what was being done in Kabylia, the ex-president of the republic Chadli Bendjedid answered a journalist of the ENTV [7] that he was not against Tamazight, but this should be written only in Arabic characters. This opinion was then taken up again by the Islamic party (MSP) leader, Abddullah Djabullah, who declared hypocritically that “we are not against Tamazight, but it is necessary to write it in Arabic characters “.

These attempts to impose on the Berber language Arabic characters, and implicitly to hinder the development of the Berber language and culture, were not limited to simple oral statements via the organ of the governmental propaganda, ENTV, but they included as well the publication of press articles and books, which spoke highly of the Arabic language so as to cause an inferiority complex in the Kabylians who were asking too loudly for their linguistic and cultural rights. Just the fact of reading the following titles will undoubtedly give the readers a clear idea about the nature of the hatred that the supporters of the Islamo-Baathism felt towards Tamazight and its unique true defenders, the Kabylians: “To face up to Berberism in Algeria; by Dr Mohamed Ali Fara, in Akhbar Al-Usbua N ° 152, of 10.09.2004“, “The Berber movement, a return towards the age of ignorance, by B. Khadidja, in Al-Massa, of 30.05.1990”, “Kabylia is only a French colonial mythology, by Abdesselam Kadi, in El-Watan of 25.08.2004“, “We are Arabs, the deputies have berberised us, by Tayeb Yanoune, in El-Youm of 13.05.2002”, “The Arabity of Algeria throughout history, by Othmane Sadi “, etc.

And as though this literature, encouraged moreover by the State itself, was not enough for erasing the Kabylian specificity, the supporters of Pan-Arabism started to hold up for prosecution and conviction the Kabylian intellectuals and artists that they qualified as separatists, atheists, racists, pro-Zionists, and many other qualifiers which had more than once forced the fanatics’ fanaticism to be transformed in the field into true criminal acts. It was in such circumstances that Kabylia lost in 1993 one of its bright writers and journalists, Tahar Djaout, and in 1998 one of its famous singers, Lounès Matoub.

Then recently, and more exactly from 5 to 7 December 2006, in Sidi Fredj, the State organised an international Symposium on the development of Tamazight, presided over by Dr Abderezzak Dourari, who showed almost pointedly his preference for the Arabic writing system. After this umpteenth attempt to prevent Tamazight from advancing, the Kabylians once more discovered with astonishment that the interface of the site of the radio channel II (public radio broadcasting in Kabyle) had been changed: the Arabic characters had taken the place of the Latin characters which acted as a writing system for Taqbaylit [8].

2. Overislamisation and political usage of Islam:

Knowing that some interpretations of the Koran recommends to the believers to obey, i.e. to submit, to the representatives, the Algerian authorities, in a purely political purpose, started since the independence to favour some aspects of the religious education within the Algerian society. In the case of Kabylia, the State encouraged, more than in any other region of Algeria, the creation of religious brotherhoods (zawiats) and the building of mosques. The department of Tizi-Ouzou possesses today, according to some estimates, the biggest number of mosques in Algeria: 731 for a total of 15 000; that is about 50 %! These places, zawiats and mosques, devoted seemingly only to worship, in reality aim also at manipulating people’s minds. The proof is that during the events of the Black Spring, and in other events Kabylia experienced, some sermons were almost nothing but copies of the manipulative speeches that the Algerian authorities delivered to the Algerians via the ENTV.

The Algerian public television and radio are almost closed in front of any Kabyle issue, except religion. In a Kabyle language excessively arabised – sermons are also means of arabization – the imams and theologians invited every evening to the Algerian television and radio studios, deliver sermons in which any custom and any behaviour which is not of oriental origin is “Haram”, proscribed, or at least is not worth knowing. Even our most glorious warriors, our wisest personalities, our most famous scholars, and our most famous women, do not serve as reference points and as examples of humanism and bravery for our imams and theologians dumbfounded in front of the often mythical feats of the Middle-East Arabs.

And when, these last months, the Algerian authorities were informed by the written press of the “proselytism” practised by some Christians in Kabylia, a series of conferences, conducted by Muslim theologians imported from the Middle-East, is held in Tizi-Ouzou, despite the fact that the evangelisation phenomenon is observed in other Algerian departments as well.

And as all means are good in this war against Kabylia, Bouteflika used his influence as the highest authority of the country and declared that “we are Imazighen which Islam has arabised”. One should understand that by accepting Islam, the Kabylians must automatically accept arabization. What a good catchpenny!

But the most dangerous strategy of the Algerian regime in Kabylia remains the creation of Islamic maquis. There had been a time where Kabylia, owing to the peace which reigned in it, was called “the Switzerland of North Africa”. Naturally, this peace, due to the non-existence of the Islamic fundamentalists, allowed the Kabylians to fight pacifically for their causes such as Tamazight and democracy, a thing which upset the Algerian authorities tremendously. It was therefore necessary for these to find a means of diversion to distract the Kabylians from their true causes.

Thus, after having withdrawn their security forces, especially after the event of the Black Spring [9] , the authorities left opened the doors of Kabylia. Naturally, when the Algerian army applied great pressure over the Islamists in other regions, several dangerous fundamentalist groups came to seek refuge in Kabylian mountains, creating therefore an alibi for the intervention of the governmental security forces as saviours and defenders of the Kabylian populations threatened by terrorists. But we are not fooled: the present situation in which Kabylia is found does not only limit the field where the Kabylians fight peacefully for their rights, but it also creates circumstances that allow the elimination of the Kabylian intellectuals and artists. Was not in such circumstances that the FFS [10] militant, Rabah Aïssat, was assassinated last year in Aïn Zaouia, in broad daylight, while the ANP [11] armed forces took control of the whole Kabylia?

In conclusion, whatever the kind of plan the Algerian authorities may use in order to depersonalize and subdue Kabylia, this one will remain everlastingly clung to and proud with its identity. Moreover, it will always remain rebel up to its liberation from all the evil forces which haunt it.

By Djaafar Messaoudi, Kabylia observer